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FACTORS INFLUENCING SETTLEMENT OF
PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH CLAIMS
IN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT LITIGATION
(Including occasionally disputatious views of excessive fees,
unnecessary delays, unreliable advice to clients, and
other regrettable improprieties)
RANDAL R. CRAFT, JR.*
[On the bulletin board in Drew's first-grade classroom, the]
teacher had written "I wish I could be a grownup so I could. .. ."
The children had drawn fanciful pictures illustrating such adult
pleasures as "so I could eat all the ice cream I want before supper"
or "so I could watch Saturday Night Live." It took me a minute to
find Drew's picture. He had drawn a drab stick-figure man dressed
in a black suit with a large brown square hooked onto his left hand.
The caption: "so I could settle cases."1
U NLESS YOU were a lawyer's child you probably had no idea
how much of a lawyer's time is spent dealing with settlement
issues. In imagining what it would be like once we achieved our
goal of becoming lawyers, few of us spent time thinking about the
settlement of cases. Many different things may have inspired us
to study law, but it is doubtful that any of our sources of inspira-
tion, certainly not the popular television programs, ever had any-
thing to say about compromising claims.
Our law schools were no help, either. We spent our time talking
about the evolution of the law, virtually all of which was reflected
in statutes and, predominantly, final court decisions that naturally
contained no references to settlement. Our professors never dis-
cussed, and we never considered, how the claims in those cases
*Partner, Haight, Gardner, Poor & Havens, New York City. B.S., Aerospace En-
gineering, University of Texas, 1964, J.D., Georgetown University Law Center,
1968.
1 Mackintosh, True Confessions of Fathers and Sons, TEXAS MONTHLY, Dec.
1980, 190, 192 (italics added).
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might have been compromised or how thousands of similar cases
might have been settled amicably. Only a few of us were taught
how to litigate, and no one ever received any guidance on when
or how to negotiate settlements. Even in the unlikely event that
our professors would have known what they were talking about
in this regard, we probably still would not have been very recep-
tive to such instruction; we did not see ourselves as going to law
school in order to learn how to settle cases.
The fact of the matter is that settlement issues command a sub-
stantial portion of an aviation lawyer's time. Nevertheless, not too
differently from law school, there is still relatively little discussion,
either in law journals or seminars, about settlement procedures,
settlement strategies, and so forth. The problem is that there is
not much that a writer or speaker can say on this subject that will
be particularly meaningful to experienced attorneys. There are,
however, some things that need to be said about a few of the factors
influencing settlements in air crash and other mass-disaster cases.
No one can describe all the factors because settlements are
contingent upon peculiar preferences, circumstances, and necessi-
ties, and they reflect the everyday experiences of markets, politics,
statecraft, and personal relations.2 Furthermore, even the factors
chosen for discussion must be treated in a truncated fashion, so
what are presented here are some very limited personal observa-
tions, many of which will be painfully prosaic and a few of which
will be at least a bit controversial.
I. THE TENERIFE EXPERIENCE
Whether it is reflected in their own direct involvement or in the
activities of their attorneys, in recent years aviation underwriters
have been taking a different approach to settling claims, and that
approach is perhaps best exemplified by the handling of the claims
arising out of the collision between a KLM Boeing 747 and a
Pan American Boeing 747 on the runway at Tenerife, in the Canary
'Coons, Compromise as Precise Justice, 68 CAL. L. REV. 250, 251 (1980). For
an esoteric analysis of the societal norms that play a role in "bargained" settle-
ments, see Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute Settlement
and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637, 638-39 (1976), which sees the outcome
of negotiations as being "heavily determined by the principles, rules, and prece-
dents that the parties invoke" rather than by mere "power, horse-trading, threat,
and bluff."
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Islands on March 27, 1977. This was not the legendary hypo-
thetical collision of 747's over third base at Yankee Stadium on
Bat Day (which would produce many more injuries than a similar
collision on Helmet Day, when helmets, not bats, are distributed
to younger fans), but the casualties were almost twice those of
the next largest accident, the Turkish Airlines DC-10 crash in
Paris on March 3, 1974. The airline underwriters and lawyers
(this writer was one of the lead counsel for Pan American) were
quite pleased with the outcome of that litigation, and in subsequent
major crash cases defendants' underwriters and lawyers have fre-
quently looked to the Tenerife case as a guide to how those cases
should be handled. The Tenerife outcome has also had a significant
effect on the way plaintiffs' attorneys handle their cases. Some
have suggested that the facts of the Tenerife case were unique
and that it is unlikely that defendants' approach in Tenerife can
be successfully used in other major air crash cases. For the most
part, this suggestion is probably wishful thinking; at any rate, the
fact remains that this approach has definitely altered the face of
aviation litigation in this country.
In general, what has come to be known as the Tenerife approach
involves efforts by defendants to settle cases at the earliest possible
moment,' with full-dollar offers not constrained by most potential
defenses such as limitations on liability. Claimants need not wait
for reasonable compensation, and that compensation need not be
diminished significantly by contingent fees paid to their attorneys.
The Tenerife approach is designed so that, even if claimants might
later get higher awards or offers, the claimants will probably net
more by settling early. The Tenerife approach may also involve
a reduction in the work done by high-priced defense lawyers, at
least until it is obvious that litigation is inevitable." However, be-
cause underwriters cannot accurately predict the roles of potential
co-defendants and third-party defendants, it is very dangerous to
s The perception of the benefits of early settlement is, of course, not new. See,
e.g., Snow, Discussion by Home Office Counsel [of Evaluation of a Personal In-
jury Case for Settlement Purposes], 23 INS. COUNSEL J. 281, 282-83 (1956).
4 As of October 1978, the defense costs for the Turkish Airlines' McDonnell
Douglas DC-10 accident litigation came to $17,000 per person, about 500% more
than the Tenerife defense costs, which had averaged $3,500 per claim at that
point. Brevetti, Defendants Will Save Money by Cooperating to Pay Claims, J.
COMM., Oct. 6, 1978, at 2, col. 1 (quoting John Hewitt).
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postpone the intensive efforts of defense counsel to prepare for
litigation; those efforts should begin immediately following any
major accident, rather than after the fat is in the fire.
II. GATHERING INFORMATION; CONTACTING THE CLAIMANTS
Early settlement offers must be based upon early information,
and underwriters begin gathering this information immediately
after the accident. The airlines' underwriters arrive at the accident
site as soon as possible in order to assist the airline and the pas-
sengers or their families. While they are helping with the more
obvious problems involved in a mass disaster, underwriters usually
learn some basic personal information about the passengers and
their families. In the weeks that follow, this information is supple-
mented during other contacts with the passengers or their families.
Also beginning immediately after the accident is an effort by
underwriters' attorneys to determine what laws will be applicable
to the potential claims and how claimant's damages will be mea-
sured under those laws. There may also be research into liability
issues of particular interest. Another inquiry affecting both dam-
ages and liability is the question of whether international conven-
tions are applicable to the accident or to the potential claims.
Ultimately, underwriters in the Tenerife case decided that their
settlement offers would be based on the law of the domiciles of
the passengers. In addition, even though willful misconduct claims
were not a serious threat, the involvement of two different airlines
in this accidene helped the airline underwriters to decide that their
settlement offers would not be constrained by the limitations of
liability of the Warsaw Convention! as modified by the Montreal
Agreement.! In cases where these limits of liability stand less chance
of being skirted, airline underwriters may not necessarily follow
the Tenerife approach. However, in recognition of the controversy
5In a collision between airplanes of different airlines, there is some doubt
whether either airline's liability limitations are applicable to claims made by pas-
sengers who were on the other airline's airplane. See Scarf v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc., 4 Av. Cas. 17,795, 17,796 (CCH) (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (dicta).
O Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air [the "Warsaw Convention"], opened for signature October
12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000; T.S. No. 876 (1934).
7 Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention
And The Hague Protocol, CAB Order No. E-23680, 31 Fed. Reg. 7,302 (1966),
approving Agreement CAB 18,900.
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over the conversion rate for the Warsaw limitation, from "gold"
francs into United States currency," settlement offers may still ex-
ceed $75,000.
Full-dollar settlement offers are based on assessments of what
the claimants would likely be awarded at trials of damage issues
alone. There is to be no discounting based on the earliness of the
offers. Of course, neither the trial awards nor the settlement offers
make any provision for fees charged by plaintiffs' attorneys. Ac-
cordingly, in the Tenerife case, Robert L. Alpert, Esq., Senior Vice
President of United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc., wrote
directly to the surviving passengers and other potential claimants to
suggest that underwriters be given the opportunity to evaluate infor-
mation supporting the claimants' damage claims and make appro-
priate settlement offers. He suggested further that the claimants
should turn initially to their family lawyers or other lawyers paid by
the hour, rather than contingency fee lawyers, for advice concern-
ing the appropriateness of these settlement offers. Coming as it did
during what one aviation plaintiffs' attorney has (jokingly?) called
"the all-important solicitation phase of the case," the Alpert letter
caused a great uproar. A number of aviation plaintiffs' attorneys
feel strongly that this letter, which has also been used in subse-
quent cases, is improper.! Nevertheless, the use of such letters in
aviation and other cases will probably increase. 0 Despite the
attacks on the letter, it seems to have survived relatively intact.
No court or bar association has censured the letter or directed
that it not be sent.11
One plaintiff's attorney's complaint about underwriters' early
communications with claimants is that the claimants who do not
8 See generally Martin, After 50 Years of the Warsaw Convention-What
Next?, AEROSPACE, March 1980, 14, at 18. For recent contributions to this contro-
versy, see Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Alitalia Airlines, 15 Av. Cas. 18,509, 18,513, n.9
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), and the recently released CAB staff internal memorandum re-
printed in LAWYER-PLoTS B. Assoc. J., Sept.-Oct. 1980, at 31.
9 For one dialogue on this letter, see THE FuTuRE OF AVIATION TORT LAw,
transcript of Proceedings of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, Mona-
co (Feb. 8, 1978).
10 Id.
n See generally In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois, on May 25,
1979, 476 F. Supp. 445, 450 n.7 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979). See also Erhardt v. Pruden-
tial Group, Inc., 629 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1980) (Defendant's president sent letter
to plaintiff class members informing them of their potential liability for attorneys'
fees).
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accept early offers right away are ultimately harder to deal with.
These communications have led such claimants to conclude that
they will have no problem recovering damages from the defendants
and that the amount will naturally be substantially higher than
the underwriters were willing to offer initially. Having reached
this conclusion on the basis of their own personal contact with
defendants' underwriters, the claimants are not easily persuaded
by their attorneys to modify their expectations.
III. THE INITIAL ROLE OF PLAINTIFFS' ATTORNEYS
Needless to say, underwriters are not the only people in contact
with potential claimants following an airplane crash. Without en-
gaging in any supposition about the manner and extent to which
attorneys might directly approach potential plaintiffs about being
retained, it is clear that there are ways of indirectly informing
passengers and their families that other claimants have already
retained attorneys to prosecute their claims. While advertising is
now a possible avenue, claimants are more often informed
through newspaper reports about newly filed actions arising out of
the accident. The reports describe the plaintiffs and may even
have a comment or two from their attorney, but the emphasis of
almost every such report is on the ad damnum. Reading such an
article, unsophisticated claimants, who assume that the amount
claimed has something to do with the amounts that may be re-
covered, are likely to be disappointed by the settlement offers being
proffered by underwriters. These claimants may even contact the
attorney mentioned in the article about representing them. An-
other reason why some plaintiffs' attorneys file their actions so soon
is the potential effect that the venue of the actions may have on
the venue selected for multidistrict litigation by the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation." In any event, a plaintiffs' attorney with
more than a few cases will seldom contact the defendants' attorney
or underwriters prior to filing these cases in court, or even prior
to the selection of the plaintiffs' committee in the multidistrict
litigation.
12 As noted later, actions instituted in various federal district courts may be
consolidated by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation and transferred to a
single district for discovery and other pretrial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407 (1976).
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Taking these ideas a step further, a few plaintiffs' attorneys file
class actions for enormous sums as soon as they can get to the
courthouse. It is clear that such actions will not be permitted in
air crash disasters," but that does not prevent a plaintiffs' attorney
from raising the issue again and, more important, publicizing to
the world that he claims to be representing all of the potential
claimants. Reading about this, some of these claimants may then
contact the attorney, who will no doubt take steps to solidify the
relationship. The other potential claimants may not contact the
attorney, but this can also work to the attorney's advantage, for
he can subsequently argue, when the class action is dismissed, as
it will almost certainly be, that all potential claimants should be
notified of the dismissal so that the claimants can then make indi-
vidual arrangements to prosecute their claims. The full effect of
this kind of situation is unclear, but the resulting confusion cer-
tainly does not help the passengers and their families.
Whether they be family attorneys or aviation specialists, once
attorneys have been retained by the plaintiffs, the underwriters
and defense counsel necessarily deal with them in seeking to ob-
tain the information required to formulate settlement offers. Fre-
quently, the plaintiffs' attorneys will submit attractive settlement
brochures describing in some detail the claimed damages and pro-
viding descriptions and photographs of the passengers and their
families. These often overblown brochures may give a more com-
plete view of the claimants' situation, but at least some under-
writers would prefer a short letter supporting the plaintiffs' de-
mands with documented facts about the income, health, marital
history, dependents, etc. Tax returns are particularly helpful; if
they are temporarily unavailable, letters from employers may suf-
fice. Any lawyer worth his salt (or at least worth his fee) should
be able in almost every case to provide such information to the
underwriters within sixty to ninety days after being retained. If
too much of that time is spent preparing a shiny settlement bro-
chure, then submission of the significant information is delayed.
It should be noted, though, that preparation of these brochures is
11See e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States District Court for
Central District of California, 523 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 911 (1976); McClintock v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., No. 77
Civ. 4092 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 16, 1978); Marchesi v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
68 F.R.D. 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
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helpful to the plaintiffs' attorneys in that it gets them started in
gathering information, photographs, and documents that will be
needed later if the cases are not settled. Perhaps more important,
the brochure itself makes a nice product to show to the claimants
as some evidence of what is being done on their behalf. Although
it is not necessarily relevant, in death cases these brochures, tell
what wonderful persons the decedents were, and decedents' repre-
sentatives are naturally very appreciative and approving.
IV. SETTING Up FUNDS AND MAKING OFFERS
In some cases offers cannot be made until after depositions or
medical examinations of the claimants, but in most uncomplicated
cases once the basic information is received the underwriters and
their counsel are in a position to respond fairly quickly with full-
dollar offers. Again, these offers do not take into account fees to
be paid to claimants' attorneys. Concomitantly, offers to claimants
who are not represented by attorneys should not be lower than
offers made to claimants in similar cases who are represented by
attorneys.
These early settlement efforts have to be backed up by the
money to pay the agreed settlement figures, and the defendants'
underwriters try to set up funds for settling the passenger cases.
The underwriters contribute to the settlement funds in accordance
with their early and very rough assessment of who has the most
to lose if the cases are not settled. Agreements as to funding
settlement "pots" and, later, as to ultimate responsibility among
defendants, are in some cases made much easier by overlapping
insurance coverage. It is not unusual in multi-defendant air crash
cases to find that two or more defendants have some of the same
underwriters. The percentages of coverage may vary in such cases,
but underwriters are obviously not anxious to have their insureds
involved in expensive fights when the same underwriters are on
both sides of the fence or, switching metaphors, when the outcome
would simply move money from one pocket to another in the same
pair of pants.
Of course, the percentage allocations of contributions to a settle-
ment fund are not set in concrete, and the defendants reserve their
rights as against each other. However, such allocations may in
fact not be changed, and some insureds who are concerned about
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the potential effect on their future premiums have asked to be
more involved in the decision-making process that establishes
the initial allocations. These insureds have asked that their under-
writers not enter into funding agreements without consulting them,
and they have further inquired about formalizing the decision-
making process by means of a policy clause providing machinery
for arbitration of any dispute between underwriters and their in-
sureds over the proposed agreements. Underwriters recognize the
need to consult with their insureds on such matters, but they are
reluctant to make these matters dependent upon procedures that
could delay the agreements and thereby destroy their utility. More-
over, underwriters consider this entire approach to be in its forma-
tive stage, so they also believe that formalizing the process at this
time would be premature.
In any event, there is widespread recognition that fights among
defendants about responsibility for settlements would cost a great
deal and would involve great delay before issues of responsibility
are resolved. The delay alone would probably increase the difficulty
of reaching settlements, and defendants' attacks on each other
would probably add fuel to litigation fires.
(This paper does not include any discussion of the especially
relevant topic of individual agreements and settlements between
a plaintiff and less than all of the defendants in the action. Whether
these are secret "Mary Carter"1 agreements or open, fully con-
summated settlements, their ramifications (not to mention their
legitimacy) are complex and are dependent upon state law, so this
broad topic is beyond the scope of this paper.)
Successfully pursuing the Tenerife approach to early settlements
requires, in those cases where the underwriters are not handling
these efforts directly, that the underwriters' legal counsel be ready,
willing, and able to do what is necessary. This is particularly im-
portant in multi-defendant cases and in cases where a single de-
fendant is represented by more than one firm, for one recalcitrant
14 A Mary Carter Agreement is a secret agreement entered into by the plaintiff
and less than all of the defendants that guarantees the plaintiff a minimum recov-
ery regardless of the trial's outcome, fixes each agreeing defendants' liability in
an inverse proportion to the liability of the non-agreeing defendant, and requires
the continued participation at trial of the agreeing defendants. Note, Gallagher
Covenants, Mary Carter Agreements, and Loan Receipt Agreements: Unsettling
Contributions to Conflict Resolution, 1977 ABIZ. ST. L.J. 117, 120-22.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
or reluctant defendants' counsel can undermine the entire approach
if he does not understand it, does not have the authority to take
the appropriate steps, or does not take those steps with due dili-
gence and promptness.
On this point, it is interesting to consider how the Federal Gov-
ernment will respond to a request that it join in a Tenerife ap-
proach to a case in which the Federal Government will be a pri-
mary defendant. The Federal Government does not hurry to
accept its share of the responsibility, even when the facts are
relatively clear. Government attorneys have traditionally wanted
to wait, if not for dispositive depositions, at least for the National
Transportation Safety Board report, even though such reports are
concerned more with safety than with fault or legal responsibility.
Those reports and depositions give Government attorneys and
their superiors something official and tangible to hang their hats
on, and thereby they avoid having to take the responsibility and
the risk of making an early decision themselves. In addition, the
Justice Department requires many levels of approval, and at each
level there may be problems caused by political concerns, inex-
perience (resulting from rapid turnover of personnel), or simple
uneasiness in dealing with the staggering amounts of money being
paid out while nothing is being received in return. In cases involv-
ing Air Traffic Control (ATC) responsibility, the Federal Aviation
Administration, which does not have control of the litigation,
may also have a deleterious influence on the Justice Department's
appraisal of the situation. The FAA often seems to ignore the
concept of joint proximate cause, and it is quick to conclude that
the accident was caused solely by the pilot and not at all by ATC.
In the cases arising out of the San Diego mid-air collision on
September 25, 1978," the Government initially declined to par-
ticipate in a settlement fund. When it finally agreed to contribute
an acceptable percentage to the settlements, it adopted the ineffi-
cient procedure of issuing, as each settlement occurred, a separate
check for its percentage contribution. It remains to be seen whether
the Federal Government will be sufficiently enlightened or wilt
have a sufficiently responsive mechanism to participate fully in a.
Tenerife approach, especially when it comes to the early establish-
's NATIONAL TRANS. SAFETY BOARD, Report NTSB-AAR-79-5 (April 20, 1979).
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nent of allocations for a settlement fund among various potential
defendants.
V. MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION; NARRowING THE ISSUES
In Tenerife the early settlement efforts by underwriters worked
quite well, and there were only 160 actions filed by or on behalf
,of Pan American passengers and crew. In addition, about thirty
actions were fied in the United States by KLM passengers and
,crew. The vast majority of the plaintiffs sued in federal courts,
mostly in California, and the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Liti-
gation consolidated these federal actions for discovery and other
pre-trial proceedings before the Honorable Robert J. Ward, in
the Southern District of New York.'" California plaintiffs' attorneys
objected strenuously to the New York location, and even moved
for reargument, which motion was denied. Most of these attorneys
appeared at the first pre-trial conference, but thereafter fewer and
fewer attorneys appeared for the conferences before Judge Ward.
'These attorneys were represented by a plaintiffs' committee, which
in turn was generally represented by the Chairman of the Com-
mittee, Chuck Krause. (One has to wonder if the distant location
of these proceedings discouraged unnecessary controversy and un-
necessary expenses and thereby helped eliminate some potential
obstacles to amicable settlements.)
Of course, settlement efforts continued, and their progress was
advanced by the defendants' proposal of a stipulation under which,
inter alia, they would agree not to contest liability for compensatory
damages and the plaintiffs would agree to withdraw all claims of
punitive damages. The stipulation was signed by the plaintiffs'
attorneys in virtually all of the unsettled cases, and it did not
thereafter prove to be a source of any great controversy except
for the question of whether defendants had, by means of the
stipulation, waived their defenses that certain plaintiffs were im-
proper parties and that certain claims (e.g., employers' claims)
were improper. Since he was present at the genesis and evolution
of this stipulation, Judge Ward was able to dispose of these con-
troversies rather easily, holding that such defenses had not been
'6 In re Air Crash Disaster at Tenerife, Canary Islands, on March 27, 1977,
.435 F. Supp. 927 (J.P.M.D.L 1977).
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waived in the stipulation."' In order to avoid such controversies,
the so-called no-contest stipulations used in subsequent crash liti-
gation have been clarified. The plaintiffs' attorneys have also re-
vised their approach to such stipulations, as indicated below.
In responding to the summons and complaints that initiated
the litigation, defense counsel served and filed (in addition to
answers) requests for production of documents, notices of deposi-
tions, and two sets of interrogatories. One set of interrogatories
was a typical long-form set designed to obtain detailed information
that would be necessary if a settlement was not forthcoming. The
second set of interrogatories was a short-form set designed to
elicit certain minimal information to be relied upon in making or
revising settlement offers. Nevertheless, there was a great deal of
difficulty in getting responses from some plaintiffs' attorneys even
to the short-form interrogatories. It also frequently was difficult
to arrange depositions of the plaintiffs. And when depositions were
taken, many times the plaintiffs (especially the widows) did not
have a sufficient background to be able to testify about certain
basic matters, such as income history. Examinations of the sur-
viving passengers by defendants' physicians were also requested;
although in that arena delays were sometimes the result of the
physician's own scheduling problems, there often was difficulty
getting the passengers' medical records at an early date. It is plain
that, if they are to be fair to their clients, attorneys have to do a
much better job of responding in a timely fashion to early dis-
covery requests. If there is going to be a settlement, the earlier the
plaintiffs get their money, the better. Furthermore, early settlement
may avoid unnecessary subsequent fees and expenses that might
adversely influence settlement decisions.
Since some attorneys do not quite see it this way, one of the
first items of business for the judge to whom multidistrict litigation
is assigned is to be sure that the damage discovery is completed
as soon as possible, particularly where liability is unlikely to be
an issue. Usually this plaintiff's damage discovery allows the de-
fendants and their underwriters to understand better the basis of
the plaintiffs' claims. Moreover, sometimes such damage discovery
11 Bowen v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 563, 566-67
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Vogel v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 450 F. Supp.
224, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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is beneficial to the defendants also because it may bring to the
attention of the plaintiffs' attorneys for the first time the weaknesses
in the plaintiffs' claims.
Discovery controversies in the Tenerife litigation were dealt with
quite promptly. Controversies about substantive issues were treated
equally promptly. Pending motions did not linger, much less fester,
and Judge Ward did not make it easy on himself by applying some
preconceived philosophy as a shortcut to decisions on the merits.
Less critical issues that could be clearly delineated were frequently
decided without the need for a motion. On more important issues,
the motions were fully briefed and were almost always accom-
panied by meaningful oral argument. Choice of law issues were
treated this way, and with respect to plaintiffs' damage claims
Judge Ward concluded that the law of the State where each pas-
senger was domiciled would be applied." Then, using that law,
Judge Ward dealt with questions concerning pre-death pain and
suffering, plaintiffs' standing, and related matters."
As you might imagine, after an airplane accident, potential
claimants seem to come out of the woodwork. In some cases there
are competing plaintiffs, and the legitimacy of their claims can-
not be determined without a trial. Settlements are much more
difficult to complete in such situations. The first step is to con-
solidate the claims into a single action and then to try to arrange
a kind of informal interpleader whereby all of the competing
plaintiffs in that action agree to the total settlement figure, which
they will then fight over among themselves without the defendants'
remaining in the case.
In situations where it is obvious that one or more of the com-
peting plaintiffs do not have standing under the applicable law,
it may be simpler to move to dismiss those actions. This was
" See, e.g., Bouvy-Loggers v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 15 Av. Cas.
17,153, 17,156, n.3 (CCH) (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Vogel v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 224, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Transcript of Hear-
ing, January 13, 1978, at 93, In re Multidistrict Litigation v. KLM Royal Dutch
Airlines, et. al. (M-11-306).
"See, e.g., Bowen v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 563
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (standing); Hohner v. KLM Airlines, Inc., No. 78 Civ. 2027
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 1978) (standing); Weller v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc., No. 78 Civ. 256 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1978) (pre-death pain and suffering);
Vogel v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 224 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (standing).
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done in a number of cases in TenerifeY Once again, Judge Ward
did not hesitate to apply the law as he understood it, and resolu-
tion of these questions cleared the air and made it possible to focus.
on the legitimate claims of the proper plaintiffs. (Perhaps the
most interesting of all of the Tenerife allegations was that a de-
ceased passenger's twin sister in California had, through the process
of extra-sensory empathy, suffered severe pain at the very moment
her sister was involved in the accident in the Canary Islands. This,
was one of the claims that was dismissed.")
When claims are baseless or when the parties are improper,.
there is naturally a temptation to settle them for small amounts,
and get rid of them. Defendants should do this only when the
claims themselves sound legitimate. Defendants should not con-
sider settling a case, even for its nuisance value, when it will be
obvious for all to see that the defendants are paying when they are
not liable. An extreme example is the case where a major airline was
sued by a plaintiff for allegedly putting an invisible powder on the
food it served her, that caused her hemorrhoids. It took two trials
and an appeal, all of which the airline won, not to mention numer-
ous court appearances, before the case was over. The fees and
expenses were inordinately expensive, but settlement could not be
considered as an option. A report in the newspaper that such a
case had been settled would cause readers to assume either that
the claims were well-founded or, worse still, that the claims were
groundless but that the airline paid nevertheless. Every nut in town
would soon be suing.
VI. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
Getting back to the discussion of Tenerife, the motion that cre-
ated the most interest and, even to this date, the most controversy
was Pan American's motion to dismiss an action by a Dutch plain-
tiff." This and other Dutch plaintiffs, who were on the KLM air-
" See, e.g., Bowen v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 563
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Vogel v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 224
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
1 Burke v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 850 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
" Bouvy-Loggers v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 15 Av. Cas. 17,153
(CCH) (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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craft but who were unable to sue KLM in the United States (pri-
marily because of the constraints of Article 28 of the Warsaw
Convention), sued Pan American in New York and California.
There were some American attorneys who had yet-unfiled cases
on behalf of other Dutch plaintiffs. When liability was no longer
at issue, the only remaining issues related to the measure of dam-
ages, and all of these issues were going to be decided according
to Dutch law, based upon the testimony of Dutch witnesses and
on Dutch records. Accordingly, Pan American moved to dismiss
the lead Dutch action by plaintiff Bouvy-Loggers on the ground
of forum non conveniens, which motion was granted.' The suc-
cess of that motion had an enormous effect on the settlement of
the KLM passenger cases. Interestingly, some plaintiffs' attorneys
have recently suggested that the decision was somehow of no im-
portance and should not be given any particular recognition be-
cause it was not published as a final decision in the Federal Supple-
ment."' But the decision was not published in the Federal Supple-
ment because of a maneuver by Bouvy-Loggers' own attorneys,
who, after the decision was rendered, moved for reargument, evi-
dently in the hope that they could undermine the value of the de-
cision as a precedent. The chief assertion was that plaintiff's attor-
neys had signed the no-contest stipulation only as a result of having
been led down the garden path by defendants' attorneys. In ac-
cordance with his usual inclination to allow the attorneys to
present their arguments as fully as they desired, Judge Ward en-
tertained the motion for reargument, but after completion of the
oral presentations, the plaintiff's attorney accepted the settle-
ment offer made prior to the motion for reargument. Moreover,
all of the other Dutch cases in the United States also settled
quickly on the basis of the then-pending offers (or very close
thereto), and none of the Dutch claimants' attorneys sought to
raise the issue again before Judge Ward. Judge Ward has never
indicated any doubt about the correctness of the consideration of
the forum non conveniens factors in his decision, which Lee Kreind-
ler called the "Tenerife Bombshell,"' and the correctness of that
decision was sufficiently obvious that all plaintiffs' attorneys decided
2 Id.
I See, e. g., Kreindler, Foreign Plaintiffs, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 15, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
2 Kreindler, Tenerife Bombshell, N.Y.L.J., April 21, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
to settle their Dutch cases rather than pursue the issue further.
The issue has been pursued in other cases, with varying results
subject to differences of interpretation," but it is certainly clear
that, absent special circumstances, foreign plaintiffs cannot count
on being able to maintain their claims in the United States. Obvi-
ously, this will be a major, if not overriding, factor in negotiating
settlements of such claims, for it is doubtful that the courts or the
legislatures, much less the Reagan Administration, will agree with
Stu Speiser's belief: "that we should use American justice as a good
will generator and provide enough judges and courtrooms so that
anyone who needs our courts in order to achieve justice can have
access to them. I cannot think of any better way to spend the tax-
payer's money.""
The United States' treatment of this issue will probably not de-
pend upon the views expressed overseas."8 Nor will it depend upon
the levels or elements of damages allowed overseas, though these
factors may have another effect. For example, most European air-
lines have increased their liability limits, and the United King-
dom's airlines, by special contract effective April 1, 1981, have
increased their limit to approximately $125,000 per passenger."
These and subsequent increases, as well as more intense use of
the Tenerife approach in Europe, may for some claimants make
it less attractive to sue in the United States, where their recovery
will be diminished by the expenses and sizeable contingency fees
of American attorneys.
VIl. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Another major issue to be dealt with as early as possible is
the law to be applied to any claims for punitive damages. Very
early on, Judge Ward expressed the tentative position that the
28 Two recent decisions to be compared are Pain v. United Technologies Corp.,
637 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1980), and Aboujdid v. Gulf Aviation Co., 108 Misc. 2d
175, 437 N.Y.S.2d 219 (N.Y. Co. 1980).
" S. SPEISER, LAWSUIT 490 (1980).
28 See generally Martin, Recent Trends in International Aviation Accident Liti-
gation-A Practical View, 5 ANNALS OF AIR LAw & SPACE LAw 189 (1980).
2 9 See Passenger Rules Tariff No. PR-3, CAB No. 55: Rule 25 (D) (1) (a) (ii),
34th revision, p. 54, March 23, 1981, applicable to British Caledonian Airways,
Ltd.; Rule 25(D) (1) (a) (ii), 35th revision, p. 54, March 31, 1981, applicable
to British Airways.
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issue of punitive damages would be determined with reference to
the law of New York regarding Pan American, and with reference
to the law of the Netherlands regarding KLM.' Since neither of
these laws permitted punitive damages, and since the circumstances
of the accident did not seem to reflect the kind of outrageous con-
duct necessary to support punitive damages, plaintiffs' attorneys
generally felt that there was little hope of obtaining punitive dam-
ages in that litigation. Therefore, they were quite willing to give
up punitive damage claims in exchange for the defendants' agree-
ment not to contest liability for compensatory damages."' Some-
what later, however, questions arose concerning claims for the
deaths of passengers from states that permitted punitive damages
as part of a compensatory-type wrongful death statute.' In these
cases, the no-contest stipulation was not executed. With respect
to a Massachusetts case, Judge Ward concluded that the wrong-
ful death statute did not apply with regard to the punitive damage
issue and that the applicable law would be that of the Netherlands,
the domicile of KLM.' Later, in a California case, Judge Ward
concluded that a California court would apply the law of Spain
(the place of the accident) or the law of the Netherlands (the
domicile of KLM) to the issue of punitive damages."
In the Chicago DC-10 litigation, the District Court determined
the sufficiency of punitive damage claims against the defendants
by referring to each respective defendant's principal place of busi-
ness at the time of the accident.' On an expedited appeal, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed, in addition, the laws
of the states where the alleged wrongdoing occurred and the laws
of the state where the disaster took place. The ultimate conclusion
I Transcript of Hearing, January 13, 1978, at 77-79, In re Multidistrict Litiga-
tion v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, et al. (M-11-306).
3, Of course, now it is clear that in wrongful death cases California does not
permit recovery of punitive damages. In re Paris Air Crash, 622 F.2d 1315, 1317
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980).
"Sibley v. KLM-Royal Dutch Airlines, 454 F. Supp. 425, 428-29 (S.D.N.Y.
1978).
" Id.
I Jackson v. KLM-Royal Dutch Airlines, 459 F. Supp. 953, 956 (S.D.N.Y.
1978).
- In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois, on May 25, 1979, 500 F.
Supp. 1044 (N.D. 111. 1980), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 644 F.2d 594 (7th
Cir. 1981 ).
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was that the applicable state law did not permit punitive damages
against either the manufacturer or the airline. The point is that,
until that appeal was decided, it was difficult to proceed with
settlement negotiations because of the hope of many plaintiffs'
attorneys that they and their clients would be able to benefit from
the award of such damages. There is always such hope with re-
spect to any potential element of damages, but nothing destabilizes
settlement discussions more than the hope of recovering punitive
damages. Although defendants' offers will probably be higher if
such damages are likely to be awarded, there is little or no way
for a defendant to make any realistic assessment of the total lia-
bility it may be facing.
There was one aviation case where the wrongdoer had no
difficulty understanding the precise relationship of the punish-
ment to the wrongdoing. A number of years ago, it was reported
that a passenger had been killed in Yemen in an airplane crash
caused by the pilot, who survived the crash. Once he was suffi-
ciently recovered, the pilot was required pursuant to court order,
to become the passenger on a similar flight, during which he was
forced out of the airplane to his death. '
VIII. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
Prejudgment interest is another major substantive issue that
affects settlement. In the Chicago DC-10 litigation, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois decided
that the juries would be instructed to include prejudgment interest
as an element of damages in those wrongful death cases." This is
not the place to examine the arguments for and against prejudg-
ment interest, but it is curious that the district court's decision was
based, at least in part, on its perception that not allowing prejudg-
ment interest would be " a real incentive for the defendants to post-
pone paying the plaintiffs."3 Maybe so, but, as indicated above,
where the Tenerife approach is used, the plaintiffs' attorneys (and
sometimes their clients) bear at least an equal, if not a greater,
' Sindel, Settlement Techniques-As Viewed by a Plaintiff's Attorney, PRAC.
LAw., Feb. 1969, 82, at 82-83.
3 In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois, on May 25, 1979, 480 F.
Supp. 1280, 1282 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
38/d. at 1287.
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responsibility for the delays in reaching settlement and in going
to trial.
This district court decision was appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which rendered its deci-
sion on February 17, 1981. Because of the idiosyncrasies of the
case, the judgment below was affirmed, but the court of appeals
concluded that, under the applicable Illinois law, the pre-judgment
interest was not allowable as a separate element of damages in
wrongful death actions.' Accordingly, the court of appeals em-
phasized "that the instructions by the trial court in this case can-
not be the model for the future wrongful death actions.""' Instead,
the court concluded that future losses should be discounted to the
date of trial, and the jury should be instructed to calculate the pres-
ent value of the amount that plaintiff would have received from
the decedent between death and trial. The calculation could well
involve the consideration of interest on that specific amount, but
this formulation would not permit prejudgment interest on the total
amount of the verdict.'
IX. FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS AND OFFERS
Once the substantive issues have been decided, the parties can
conduct settlement negotiations on more common ground. If the
parties are going to rely on some kind of formula to arrive at a
settlement figure, this would be the time to do it. But the typical
simplistic formulas are seldom useful except as "makeweights,"
and, at least in recent times, attorneys have properly shied away
from them, realizing each case has to be treated distinctively; that
is the way it will be treated at trial by the jury.'
At some point after they have sufficient information about each
" In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois, on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d
633 (7th Cir. 1981).
40 Id. at 638.
41 id.
42 id. at 644.
43 See Galiher, The Defendant's Lawyer Looks at Settlement, 31 INs. COUNSEL
J. 65, 68 (1964); Kelner, Settlement of Personal Injury Cases, 53 N.Y. ST. B. J.
116, 117 (1981). There have been attempts to construct complicated formulas
that would better reflect complex variables, see, e.g., Note, An Analysis of Settle-
ment, 22 STAN. L. REV. 67 (1969), but I am not aware that there have been any
practical applications of these formulas.
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plaintiff's claim (which may require additional depositions, etc.)
and after they have engaged in some negotiations with the plaintiff's
attorneys, the underwriters or their attorneys may reach a conclu-
sion that it is unlikely that they will decide to increase the pending
settlement offer. At that time, underwriters usually instruct their
attorneys to serve offers of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or pursuant to some similar
state statute. Offers of judgment have frequently been used in
aviation cases, and apparently no problems have developed. Never-
theless, these offers have not been the subject of much litigation,
and there are some questions about possible adverse effects of
such offers." For example, the potential res judicata effect on
negligence counterclaims in a comparative negligence jurisdiction
must be considered.'
Offers of judgment must be accepted within 10 days if they
are to have formal effect, ' but, like other offers and demands,
once made they seem to take on a life of their own. Barring some
drastic change in the state of the case, prior offers and demands
are the foundations on which all subsequent negotiations are
based. Unfortunately, trying to get a judge to recognize that a
previous settlement offer has been withdrawn because of the plain-
tiff's failure to respond in a timely fashion is virtually impossible,
even when plaintiff's failure caused the underwriters to incur much
greater expenses for litigation and trial preparation.
X. THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE
Because public policy favors settlements, judges (including
magistrates and masters) get involved in settlement negotiations
when the parties reach an impasse, and they can be a great help
or a great disappointment." Though little can be said here to re-
4Armato, Offers of Judgment and Compromise: Turning the Tables on Your
Opponent, 55 CALIF. ST. B. J. 286 (1980); Blecke, Make the Settlement Offer
an Offer of Judgment, FoR THE DEFENSE, Dec. 1980, at 21; Stieglitz & White,
The Offer of Judgment Rule: A Sword and a Shield, FoR TIlE DEFENSE, Feb.
1980, at 29 [hereinafter cited as Stieglitz & White].
' See Stieglitz & White, supra note 44.
" FED. R. Ctv. P. 68.
47 See Fox, Settlement: Helping the Lawyers to Fulfill Their Responsibility,
53 F.R.D. 129 (1971), in which Judge Fox provides an excellent examination of
judges' roles in settlement negotiations.
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flect the overall importance of this particular topic to the entire
subject, the judges' role in bringing the parties together cannot
be overemphasized. This is certainly not meant to be a suggestion
that the judges get out their hammers and pound on the parties.
The judges who will have the most effect will be those who can best
exercise powers of persuasion, usually by virtue of having done
their homework and by virtue of being eminently fair to both sides
in the controversy. Being eminently fair does not mean simply
splitting the difference. All too often a settlement conference is
nothing more than an announcement of the offer and the demand
by the parties, followed by the judge coming down squarely in the
middle. The only answer to this type of judicial approach to settle-
ments is to have the judge assess the case prior to hearing the offer
and the demand.
Judges who do not follow the knee-jerk, split-the-difference ap-
proach must have a good appreciation of verdict ranges for the
general type of case, and they must be astute enough to recog-
nize the importance of the differences between the case before
them and the general types of cases that the verdict ranges repre-
sent. A judge's suggestion that an outstanding offer is low or
that a demand is high will be of little effect unless it appears
that the judge's conclusion was arrived at intelligently and knowl-
edgeably, with a full appreciation of the likely result of the trial.
If he has been receiving closing statements in settlements of the
cases before him, the judge can develop a feel for the appropriate-
ness of the offers and demands in the remaining cases. Plaintiffs'
attorneys have tried to gain access to the information on indi-
vidual settlements, but such unnecessary disclosure would violate
the confidentiality of the settlement. It might also be unfair to
the parties by allowing their settlements to be parlayed into a higher
recovery for someone else, ' resulting in a round of second-guessing
that would discourage early settlements in similar litigation in the
future.
The judge may well be involved in the trial, even if this is a
"' Consider the following statement from Kriendler, DC-JO: Stipulation and
Settlements, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 16, 1979, at 1, col. 1 (emphasis supplied): "Plaintiff's
lawyers would like to have settlement information on the individual cases, of
course, so that they can make sure that their clients are as well compensated, or
better compensated, than others similarly situated."
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transferred multidistrict case. "' Accordingly, the judge has an op-
portunity to exert additional force in settlement negotiations, but
blatant threats of retribution are of little use. What is of use is a
judge's identification of a party's or an attorney's Achilles' Heel
and its use as the focus of suggestions as to how the case might
proceed. In other words (giving the judge the benefit of the doubt),
no one is going to believe that the judge will ultimately risk his
own reputation by going out of bounds to get back at a party or
attorney who has ignored his recommendations. It is, however,
reasonable to expect that, in an area where a party already recog-
nizes his position to be weak, the judge may well handle the issue
to the disadvantage of that party or attorney if the offer or demand
is not altered to take account of that weakness.
Similarly, with respect to discretionary matters, a judge can exer-
cise an immense amount of influence, but here again the influence
is most effective when the discretionary authority is being exercised
in support of a recognizably reasonable position. If the parties
and the attorneys do not, either on their own or as a result of
discussions with the judge, recognize and understand the weak-
nesses in their cases, even forceful attempts to resolve a controversy
will probably be relatively ineffective.
If one or more of the parties is being completely unreasonable,
then the judge may conclude that the only solution is to bring the
case to trial immediately. In the Tenerife cases, the defendants,
as part of the overall Tenerife approach, pushed for early trials,
and a number of cases were not settled until the plaintiffs' attor-
neys saw that there were going to be no further negotiations and
that the trials were going to be held at once.
Of course, settlements during trial are also possible, and the
parties obviously should listen to the observations of an astute
judge as the trial progresses. Assuming that the plaintiff's position
appears strongest immediately after completion of the plaintiff's
case, defense counsel should generally avoid settlement overtures
49 Cases transferred to district judges for multidistrict litigation pre-trial pro-
ceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 have frequently been tried by those trans-
feree judges as a result of those judges' having transferred the cases to themselves
for all purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404. See Speiser, Dynamics of Airline
Crash Litigation: What Makes the Cases Move?, 43 J. AIR. L. & COM. 565, 571
(1977). Although it is unusual, the transferee judge may also try multidistrict
cases after they are remanded to the transferor courts. For example, Judge Ward
went to California to try some Tenerife cases after they had been remanded.
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at that point. However, there are many trials in which the defend-
ants' best shots will be during the cross examination of the plain-
tiffs' witnesses, and in those trials defense counsel may find the
close of plaintiff's case the optimum time to broach settlement,
probably through the judge.
Early damage trials are also important in another respect. To
the extent that they may be similar to or somehow representative of
other unsettled cases, the cases tried may be treated as precedents,
and the outcomes of the trials may weigh heavily on the negotia-
tions in those other cases.
XI. THE ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY
In view of the procedures and pressures described thus far, one
may well ask why more air crash cases are not settled as a matter
of course. The answer lies in other factors affecting settlement
including attorneys' attitudes, inertia, insufficient communications
with the client, inexperience, ego, and, not surprisingly, money.
These factors may cause some defense attorneys to be less than
committed to the Tenerife approach and some plaintiffs' attorneys
to be unresponsive or outright antagonistic.
Many delays in providing damage information that could be
the basis of an early settlement are simply the result of less-than-
intense efforts to deal with matters as they ought to be dealt with.
And on some occasions, such delays are apparently intentional or
very close to it. There recently was one instance in which a plain-
tiff's attorney, who had been retained fairly soon after a major
accident, refused to respond to underwriters' requests for informa-
tion and, by waiting until the last minute to file his action, pre-
vented underwriters from extricating that information by means
of formal discovery proceedings. There is no question that this
is an effective way to keep a client from receiving a reasonable
settlement offer at an early time.
XII. PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY'S FEES
Contingency fees also have an effect on settlements. American
underwriters and their attorneys do not oppose the contingent fee
system,' for such fees, even though they take a large share of the
11 See, e.g., THE FUTURE OF AVIATION TORT LAW 239-45, transcript of Proceed-
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ultimate recovery, can be justified by the risk and the work."
The question is whether contingent fees are appropriate when lia-
bility is not at issue or when the claimants' recoveries are other-
wise not really contingent. Entrepreneur tort lawyers may have
to set their fees high enough so that fees from winning cases will
offset the lack of fees from losing cases," but this equation con-
cerns cases with contingencies; cases in which there is little or
nothing contingent should not have to bear this burden. Claimants
may feel the same way, so early settlement offers can obviously
put pressure on plaintiffs' attorneys' fee arrangements when the
offers do not appear to relate to the presence or efforts of the
attorneys in the case. Of course, it is not easy for a plaintiff's
attorney to recommend acceptance of an offer that is made early
enough and at a high enough figure that it will prevent him from
conscientiously taking the percentage fee he had contracted to
receive. Even if such attorneys are unwilling to attempt to justify
their fees by doing needless work or creating unnecessary delays,
there may still be a reluctance to recommend acceptance.
Not infrequently, this reluctance to settle early is based on the
attorneys' experiences in previous settlement negotiations in ordi-
nary cases. Typically, after receiving the initial settlement offer
in such a case, the attorney was in contact with defense counsel
or underwriters on five or so separate occasions, and on almost
every occasion the offer was increased incrementally. The attor-
ney expects that it will work the same way in major air crash liti-
gation, and he is frustrated when he discovers that the Tenerife
approach is not supposed to work that way. Accordingly, after re-
jecting the original offer some time earlier, the plaintiffs' attorney
may find himself trapped if he cannot persuade defendants' under-
writers to increase the offer. For their part, the underwriters are
generally unwilling to increase the offer unless the attorney can
demonstrate something that was not sufficiently considered by un-
derwriters beforehand.
Of course, if the case is tried some years later the verdict may
ings of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, Monaco (Feb. 8, 1978)
(Remarks of John V. Brennan).
"See generally Kreindler, Cost and Compensation, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 1981,
at 1, col. 1.
" See generally S. SPEISER, LAWSUIT 593 (1980), reviewed in Hughes, A
Mixed Bane, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, March 19, 1981, 16, 17.
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well be substantially in excess of the original offer, and, if it is,
the plaintiff's attorney will congratulate himself and his client for
rejecting the offer. But such self-congratulations are often un-
founded, because, by accepting and investing the amount originally
offered, the client could have netted as much as or more than he
did by waiting for a higher verdict and having to pay substantial
attorneys' expenses and fees out of that verdict.
The difficulty of dealing with sensitive fee problems in indi-
vidual cases is aggravated by the variation in the contingency fees
contracted for by different plaintiffs' attorneys. While a 33 1/3%
contingency fee is fairly common for a typical case, many plain-
tiffs' attorneys believe that a 20% fee is more reasonable where
liability is not at issue. However, some plaintiffs' attorneys still
insist on a 40% contingency fee. Interestingly, there may even be
variations among the fees charged by the same attorney for similar
cases, which variation may have resulted from the posture of the
cases when the attorney was retained. Though it cannot be said
so with certainty, this variation may also reflect pressures of com-
petition that may have arisen in a particular situation. A related
factor is the number of cases that an attorney has, for the lawyers
who have more cases are less likely to charge as high a percentage
contingency fee as lawyers who have only a few cases. And more
often than not, in multidistrict litigation the attorneys with the
larger number of cases are actually doing more work to justify
their fees than are the attorneys with one or two cases.
In the DC-10 litigation, the multidistrict judges criticized the
"fairly wide disparity" in the fee arrangements for the various cases
that had been settled." Recognizing that there was nothing that
the defendants could do about this disparity, Judge Will said that
it was the responsibility of plaintiffs' counsel and the judges. He
suggested that plaintiffs' counsel police themselves in order to
reduce the disparity and get some kind of reasonable consensus.
What Judge Will said from there on is too sensitive to paraphrase
even for the sake of brevity:
I recognize that if a lawyer says, "I have a contract, and I don't
care what the rest of you fellows think, and I don't even care what
the judges think," that he probably is immune from direct action,
53 Transcript of Hearing, Nov. 6, 1980, In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Chica-
go, Illinois, on May 25, 1979.
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although I don't think he's immune from the possibility that some-
body will report to an appropriate committee of a Bar Association
or an integrated Bar that his conduct is seriously out of line.
I see lawyers back there shaking their heads on the theory that,
to hell with you, whatever agreement I make is what I make, and
if I want to give my client a good shafting, it's okay with them,
and there's nothing you can do about it. I'll tell you right now that
if we see anybody giving a client a good shafting, we'll figure out
something to do about it, and you can shake your head all you
like, but you do not have a license to steal because you are ad-
mitted to the practice of law, nor do you have a license to gouge
because you are admitted to the practice of law. And a judge can-
not sit up here and see somebody gouged and do nothing about it,
and neither Judge Robson nor I intend to be in that position.
So you can just make up your mind-you can shake your heads
all you like, but the fact of the matter is that we are not going to
stand by and see closing statements or settlement agreements or
settlement reports which indicate that there was gouging and do
nothing about it.."
Following some colloquy with plaintiffs' committee representa-
tives, who joined in his concern, Judge Will restated his position:
[Y]ou have to get a little worried when you see some of these per-
centage fees in relatively early settlements in cases in which there
is no contested liability, and the amounts involved are substantial.
You know, you cannot just sit idly by and say, "Well, that's all
right. These were arm's length bargains between knowing people,
and, sure, this lawyer is getting a tremendous windfall, but, what
the hell, this is his lucky day," or something of that sort. I don't
think you can just stand by and do nothing about that.
I'm not sure what we can do. I know some of the things we can
do, and we have discussed it, and at some point we are going to
do it, because I do not think that judges can stand by and watch
lawyers gouge clients and do nothing about it.'
Clearly, Judge Will's brush was not intended to tar all plain-
tiffs' attorneys, and his major concern was with fairness to the
clients. He is quoted here primarily because the unreasonably
high fees referred to can have adverse effects on the chances of
settlement.
This situation is complicated even further when the local con-
54 1d. at 8-10.
-Id. at 14.
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tingency fee attorney refers his case to an aviation or other tort
specialist, who typically contracts to receive a large part of the
contingency fee of the original attorney. (The original attorney
may shop around for the best deal, so there is at this level a good
bit of competition among the specialists.) Since so-called referral
fees are frowned upon, the referring attorney may justify his fee
by playing a role in the handling of the case, but the referring
attorney's role may well not be commensurate with his share of
the fee. Accordingly, in its settlement efforts a defendant should
consider the possibility that the plaintiffs' two firms may have
different interests and, therefore, different approaches to a poten-
tial settlement.
The aviation or tort specialists to whom cases are referred are
usually the attorneys who carry the multidistrict litigation burden.
As lead counsel, liaison counsel, or members of plaintiffs' coordi-
nating or discovery committees, these specialists represent all of
the plaintiffs in the battles over major legal issues and in any dis-
covery proceedings relating to liability or punitive damages. Insofar
as they are receiving part of the fees for the cases that have been
referred to them, the attorneys on these plaintiffs' committees will
be paid for their work. However, there are always a number of
the plaintiffs' attorneys whose cases benefit from the services of
the plaintiffs' committees but who are not, in the absence of court
orders, obliged to pay for those services. If these cases are part of
the multidistrict litigation, then the multidistrict court will usually
require that the plaintiffs' committee members be compensated
with pro rata contributions from each case to cover expenses and
with a small share of the settlement proceeds to cover services
rendered. (If there are state court cases pending, then the multi-
district plaintiffs' committee will also attempt to obtain a similar
order from the state court judges, for the multidistrict discovery is
usually made applicable to the state court cases.)
This potential fee-sharing results in another divergence of in-
terest among plaintiffs' attorneys, a divergence that is of particular
importance to settlement efforts. The plaintiffs' attorneys in these
various cases are not anxious to share their fees with the plaintiffs'
committee, and, if they believe that the plaintiffs' committee's share
will be too large, then in cases where liability is not contested they
may prefer to settle their cases before the court requires such a
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sharing of the settlement proceeds. In order to counter this
fairly wide-spread attitude, the attorneys on the plaintiffs' discovery
committee in the Chicago DC-10 litigation initially requested only
a small pro rata contribution from each case to cover the plaintiffs'
committee's expenses and nothing to pay for their services. This
removed one incentive for individual plaintiff's attorneys to settle
early, but it is questionable whether such a tactic would have the
same effect where there was no hope for a punitive damage award
that would significantly increase the total recovery. At any rate,
similar tactics will certainly be less than persuasive in the future
because, even though punitive damages were eliminated in the
Chicago DC-10 litigation, the plaintiffs' committee later made
a fee request to cover its services in connection with the pro-
ceedings through the date of the Seventh Circuit decisione on
punitive damages. At the February 26th pretrial conference,
the plaintiffs' committee suggested that 5% of each settle-
ment or judgment be deducted from the attorneys' fees in
the respective cases and held for use in paying the committee
for its services to date.' In this connection, it should be mentioned
that such applications are not necessarily granted as a matter of
course. For example, in the Eastern Airlines Everglades accident
litigation, the plaintiffs' committee's requested fee share was re-
duced,"' and in some individual cases the committee received even
less.
There is a dilemma here. Where liability or punitive damages
are not at issue, the committee's workload is relatively small, and
its role may not justify the members' usual fees. On the other hand,
if they are at least temporarily able to keep liability or punitive
damages at issue, the attorneys comprising the plaintiffs' committee
may have too much work to do in connection with those issues,
and the fees they receive may not provide enough profit to justify
the workload and the investment of time and talent. Plaintiffs'
51 In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois, on May 25, 1979, 500 F.
Supp. 1004 (N.D. Il. 1980), rev'd in part and afl'd in part, 644 F.2d 594 (7th
Cir. 1981).
1TTranscript of Hearing, February 26, 1981, at 85-86, In Re Air Crash Dis-
aster Near Chicago, Illinois, on May 25, 1979.
51 In Re Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades on December 29, 1972,
549 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1977). See generally Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.,
557 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1977).
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attorneys have to be aware of the time investment that would be
justified by the fees expected. If an attorney has only a few cases
of his own, or if his cases are not likely to produce large settle-
ments or verdicts, then this will directly influence the amount of
time that he and his firm can spend on this litigation.
Some plaintiffs' attorneys have tried to find a middle ground.
They take cases directly and by referral at competitive rates, keep
liability at issue in those cases, and participate on the plaintiffs'
discovery committee, but, when it comes to the actual handling
of depositions and document discovery, they send the younger
attorneys in the office because their time is less valuable. Utilizing
the younger attorneys will reduce the rate at which potential profits
are eaten up by the workload. Furthermore, the various firms repre-
sented on the plaintiffs' discovery committee will take turns send-
ing representatives to depositions, document productions, and other
time-consuming activities. By being personally represented, how-
ever occasionally, the attorneys' firms have something tangible to
point to when it comes to explaining their fees in their own cases
and in the other multidistrict cases that benefit from their discovery
activities. Unfortunately for the rest of the plaintiffs, this approach
dilutes the time and talent invested; it sometimes results in the
plaintiffs being intermittently represented by inexperienced, less
knowledgeable attorneys, in which case those attorneys may have
to rely on other parties to carry the discovery burden. Thereafter,
if these cases do proceed to trial on liability or punitive damages,"
it may then be discovered that all of the potential evidence was
not developed during discovery proceedings or that it was not
developed in a manner suitable for use by the plaintiffs. All this
has to be kept in mind by the plaintiffs' attorney who is consider-
ing settlement of his cases.
As indicated earlier, even if the Tenerife approach does not re-
sult in early settlement of a case, it may affect the trial of that
case by eliminating the issue of liability through the "no-contest"
stipulation. It has been observed on a number of occasions that
trials on compensatory damages alone are "sterile" and less likely
59 Ultimately, where liability is a genuine issue, the decision to gamble on a
trial rather than accept substantial settlement offers cannot be made without con-
sideration of each client's particular situation. Cf. Phillips, Discussion by Defense
Counsel [of Evaluation of a Personal Injury Case for Settlement Purposes], 23
INS. COUNSEL J. 275, 275-76 (1956).
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to result in substantial verdicts than are trials where fault is proved
in front of a jury.* This is another reason why plaintiffs' attorneys
would prefer to keep liability at issue. In line with this concern,
the proposed no-contest stipulation may be reworded to water
down the exculpatory aspect of the defendants' agreement not to
contest liability. However, assuming that plaintiffs' attorneys would
not stoop to spurious allegations of punitive damages in order to,
keep liability at issue, there seems to be very little that plaintiffs'
attorneys can do to overcome defendants' intention not to contest
liability. It is inconceivable that a judge would allow plaintiffs to
tie up, for one trial, much less 200 trials, the court system and
everyone else involved in the litigation just so one or more plain-
tiffs could get some doubtful additional amount of damages by
trying an uncontested issue. For one thing, there is just not enough
evidence to show that damage verdicts would be significantly
affected by concurrent consideration of liability issues. Further-
more, even if there were a trial of liability, in multidistrict litiga-
tion it is likely that there would be only a single such trial.
The foregoing should demonstrate that plaintiffs' attorneys' fee
arrangements can significantly affect the entire settlement process,
and it is probably not uncommon for these arrangements to be
the source, sometimes less than obviously, of an impasse in settle-
ment negotiations. Such an impasse, if it is to be resolved, will
probably have to be resolved by a judge. Again, the judge has
to be particularly astute. He must know when to push and when
not to push. He must be willing to set cases down for prompt
trials, and he must be determined to set aside the time and do the
required work to follow through on such trial schedules. But at
this point it should be emphasized that the judge must also be
willing to review fee arrangements to insure that they are reason-
able under the circumstances and are not the source of the settle-
ment impasse. This can be done in connection with approvals of
settlements, but the judge can also indicate his views on the matter
during settlement negotiations.
Reliance on a probate court for fee approval is no answer, for
probate courts usually have little or no information concerning
the litigation, except for the potentially self-serving information
'o See, e.g., Kreindler, DC-1O: Stipulation and Settlement, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 16,
1979, at 1, col. 1.
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presented to them by the attorney who is seeking approval of
his fee. Furthermore, in some states the probate court only ap-
proves those portions of the settlement that relate to minors, and
there is at least one situation where it appears the settlement
was restructured so that the attorney's fee would not be reflected
in the minor's portion of the settlement.
Determining the reasonableness of contingency fee agreements
is not easy. There are not very many decisions on point, but par-
ticular attention should be given to the 1979 decision of the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals in Dunn v. H. K. Porter Co.,1 which
held that a district court has the authority, sua sponte, to review
contingency fee agreements in class actions and to set aside agree-
ments yielding unreasonable fees." Under this decision, plaintiffs'
counsel has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that its contingency fee agreement is not the result of
overreaching by counsel and that the fee is reasonable. Subsequent
decisions in the Fourth Circuit (involving a class action) and in
the Eighth Circuit (involving a statutory fee award) concluded
that the district courts have an obligation and responsibility to
monitor contingent fee agreements for reasonableness and to limit
fees accordingly." It will be interesting to see how these decisions
are applied in individual negligence and product liability actions
in federal courts, and how these courts will treat state laws and
rules concerning contingent fees.
The subject of fees cannot be discussed without mentioning
structured settlements. Since they have been the subject of wide-
spread analysis and controversy, " and since they would be too com-
plex and unwieldy to deal with properly in this paper, it should
simply be noted that the handling of the attorneys' fees can be
61602 F.2d 1105 (3rd Cir. 1979).
62 Id. at 1108-09, 1114.
63 International Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. Western Airlines, Inc., 623 F.2d
1255, 1277-78 (8th Cir. 1980); Allen v. United States, 606 F.2d 432, 435-36 (4th
Cir. 1979).
"See, e.g., Broder, Structured Settlements, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 8, 1980, at 1, col. 1;
Broder, Structured Settlements, N.Y.L.J., July 11, 1980, at 1, col. 1; Broder, Struc-
tured Settlements, N.Y.L.J., June 13, 1980, at 1, col. 1; Cayea, Letter to the Edit-
or, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 20, 1980, at 2, col. 5; Hindert, Periodic Payment of Personal
Injury Damages, 31 FE'N INS. COUNSEL Q. 3 (1980); Kelner & Kelner, Struc-
tured Settlements, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 13, 1980, at 1, col. 1; Mangano, Letter to the
Editor, N.Y.L.J., June 27, 1980, at 2, col. 5.
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the critical factor affecting the acceptance or rejection of the
structured settlement.
XIII. THE ROLE OF THE DEFENSE COUNSEL
The plaintiffs' attorneys are not the only high-priced lawyers
who are affected by the Tenerife approach. Turning our attention
to defense counsel, the first point to be made is that the affect
which their fees have on settlement efforts is very different from
the way those efforts are affected by the fees of plaintiffs' attorneys.
Seldom does the amount owed by a defendant to its attorneys
affect the actual determination of whether or not the case should
be settled. As suggested previously, however, defense counsel can
unconsciously interfere with the Tenerife approach by failing to
take the appropriate steps with understanding, diligence, and
promptness. Where a single defendant's settlement efforts are
handled or approved by more than one firm, there is a particularly
high likelihood that someone will drop the ball in the process.
A more typical complaint about defense counsel is that they are
frequently guilty of "running their meters". Since they are paid by
the hour, it is supposedly in their interest to run up as many
hours as possible, even if it means making unnecessary motions
and performing other tasks of remote utility. Be that as it may,
where the client sees this happening it becomes an incentive to-
ward, not against, early settlement." The key phrase here is "where
the client sees this happening;" in fact, the client may not realize
what is happening. This might not be so bad if extra work was
the only thing of which the client was ignorant. Unfortunately,
the client may also be insufficiently aware of legal and factual
aspects of the case that would affect the client's thinking about
his settlement posture. Because of promising reports from their
defense counsel, underwriters frequently find themselves paying
substantial fees to their counsel over a period of years, in a case
in which counsel ultimately advises them to settle for an amount
not very different (in constant dollars) from the amount for which
the case could have been settled early on. Therefore, clients should
be much less troubled about defense counsel going overboard in
I Cf. Weston, Discussion by Plaintiff's Counsel [of Evaluation of a Personal
Injury Case for Settlement Purposes], 23 INS. COUNSEL J. 269, 273 (1956).
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working on a case than about their counsel's provision of in-
complete or inappropriate assessments and advice concerning the
status and future of the issues being litigated, not to mention the
status of settlement possibilities.
It must be remembered that attorneys have to play two differ-
ent roles." One role is as an advocate who firmly presents to the
opposition the arguments that favor his client's point of view. With
respect to his presentation to the client, however, the attorney
plays a different role, the role of counselor. The role of advocate
and the role of counselor should be kept separate, and the attorney
ought to know the difference and know when to be one or the
other. All too often attorneys let the two roles overlap, and the
result is that the clients are misled. For example, in assessing
settlement possibilities and recommending settlement figures, attor-
neys have to be markedly more objective than they are in their
dealings with the opposition,"T but, unfortunately, some attorneys
seem constitutionally unable to do this. Whether they are dealing
with the opposition or with their clients, they have only two speeds
-go and stop-and, while their words are perhaps different, the
substance of their remarks to the opposition and to the clients is
the same. This is frequently the approach of those defense counsel
who believe that settlements are a coward's way out of litigation.
Such counsel are disinclined towards settlements, and, in some
instances, even fail to relay the opposition's most recent indications
of interest in settlement. These counsel believe that they have been
mandated to fight the case as hard as possible and without quarter,
and they believe that, as part of that fight, their role is to bolster
the client's moral and confidence in the ultimate ability to win."'
Not dissimilar is the situation where attorneys handle their cases
too personally and treat them either as their own causes or as their
own vehicles for gaining fame and adulation. Perhaps clients should
pay heed to Sir Francis Bacon's suggestion that, in choosing nego-
0See Loevinger, The Lawyer's Role Before Litigation, 11 VAtN. L. REv. 155
(1957) [hereinafter cited as Loevinger].
67 Id. at 156, 165.
* "Some unsophisticated clients expect this role as a matter of course, and an
attorney who tries to be a devil's advocate or just a dispassionate appraiser of the
client's best interests in terms of settlement will find these clients concluding that
he is not fully their champion or that he is a turncoat. Dispassionate assess-
ments in auditors' letters can also be upsetting to clients; the timing of such let-
ters may be the source of some additional problems.
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tiators to represent them, "it is better to choose men of the plainer
sort," for they are more likely to do what is assigned to them, and
to report back accurately, than those representatives who would
seek somehow to grace themselves in the process."'
When the attorneys get their roles confused, there is little hope
of a client getting the kind of objective counseling the client has
a right to expect in settlement negotiations. "[T]he lawyer who
counsels a client on the basis of resolving numerous doubtful points
in favor of a desired result will usually mislead the client into a
much less favorable position than was anticipated."7 In this same
vein, it should be hurriedly pointed out that an attorney's analysis
of the case cannot take his client's story at face value. Information
coming from clients should not be given any extra credit because
of the source; if anything, such information should be treated with
extra caution when it is generated in a non-adversary context by
people who are interested in protecting themselves or their points
of view, who have a pecuniary motivation, or who have only a
limited or partial understanding of all of the information that is
available. Attorneys cannot go wrong by considering client-
generated information as unreliable until they are able to verify
it themselves through extensive interviews and document reviews.
And once an attorney has differentiated between the client's story
and the actual facts, he must then differentiate the actual facts
from the admissible evidence.
Role confusion is less of a problem on the defense side when
the case is being managed by primary underwriters who take very
active roles in the settlement process, for the claims staffs of such
underwriters handle the negotiations with claimants and claim-
ants' attorneys. Defense lawyers regret losing control of this aspect
of the case, but on the whole they recognize that well-staffed and
highly qualified claims organizations can, in mass disaster cases,
usually provide more efficient handling of the intensive and exten-
sive settlement efforts that, under the Tenerife approach, must take
place over a relatively short period of time. Defense counsel, on
the other hand, should be used in those negotiations where the
outcome may turn on issues as to which underwriters have relied
on the counsel's factual or legal analysis. In those situations, the
69 SIR FRANCIS BACON, Of Negotiating, ESSAYS OF SIR FRANCIS BACON.
70 Loevinger, supra note 66, at 156.
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defense counsel are probably better able to handle the give-and-
take with plaintiffs' attorneys about the correctness of that analysis.
The Tenerife approach is less likely to be followed successfully
where it is not the underwriters but, rather, the insured who is
managing the litigation. The insured's own inexperience may cause
economic realities to be overlooked, and the insured's attorneys
may be inexperienced in or uncomfortable with the requisite early
efforts towards settlement. A special problem may develop where
the attorneys representing the insured (or "partially insured") in
litigation are also the attorneys who are corporate counsel for the
insured. The insured's attorneys are the primary source of informa-
tion for the insured and, significantly, the underwriters. Such
attorneys' reports to underwriters may well be influenced, con-
sciously or unconsciously, by interests of the insured that may
undermine settlement efforts. For example, in the view of most
underwriters, putting off the inevitable is poor settlement strategy,
for the ultimate settlement will probably be more expensive. A par-
tially insured corporation may, however, want to delay settlement
for reasons having to do with the timing of financial reports, pend-
ing product sales, contemporaneous public relations problems, etc.
This factor, along with the natural inclination of corporate counsel
to reassure corporate personnel that their responsibility for the
accident is not as great as others might think, creates a situation
where it may be difficult to give underwriters the kind of objective
analysis upon which the settlement process depends. Moreover,
in extreme situations, such attorneys may utilize the discovery
process to persuade underwriters of the righteousness of the in-
sured's cause. Out to prove a point rather than prepare for trial,
the attorneys are able, because of the liberality of the federal dis-
covery rules, to generate (in addition to excessive fees) favorable
testimony and documents that are neither reliable nor ultimately
admissible at trial, but that nevertheless are considered as disposi-
tive in the attorneys' reports. When underwriters base their settle-
ment positions on such reports, reasonable settlements are un-
likely. Unfortunately, perhaps the only people capable of picking
apart such a report are the opposing attorneys, but there is no
method for them to do this. Someday perhaps there will be. Until
then, we will probably have to rely upon the wariness and realism
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of underwriters and upon the unwillingness of judges to permit
the discovery process to be used simply as an unrestrained play to
the grandstand.
Of course, most defense attorneys do not find themselves in
the unusual situation just described. At least in litigation of fully
covered passengers' claims in which there is no conflict, the de-
fense attorneys are essentially serving a single master, the under-
writers. Where the underwriters are knowledgeable and involved
directly in the settlement efforts, they come to their own conclu-
sions about the worth of a case. This cimcumstance leads to a dis-
cussion of a different kind of pressure, the pressure to support the
underwriters' view of the worth of the claim.
Where underwriters have independently evaluated a case, at-
torneys are not anxious to suggest to them that the resulting offer
is very far off target. On the other hand, the attorneys have a duty
to be honest, and they also do not want to agree wholeheartedly
with the appropriateness of the offer if they believe that the ulti-
mate verdict may well be substantially in excess of the offer so
that their reputations may suffer as a result. Where an attorney be-
lieves that the case may be tried to a favorable result, but that
the chances are slim, he is in an even greater bind if he, like
other trial attorneys, wants the opportunity to demonstrate his
ability to win when the odds are against him. There are different
ways of handling this kind of situation, and they depend upon the
particular case and the individuals involved. The attorneys must
satisfy themselves that the underwriters understand all of the rele-
vant factors. Needless to say, there is a distinct difference between
the reasonableness of an offer and the range of reasonably expected
verdicts. The offer may be toward the bottom of the verdict range
because of other considerations, such as the possibility of avoiding
liability altogether. The prediction of the range of verdicts need
not include every possible verdict, however wild, but there had
better be some clearly communicated objective recognition of the
risks involved in going to trial. Of this and other matters, under-
writers complain that they too often hear what their counsel be-
lieve they want to hear, while they would prefer that more defense
counsel were willing to make forthright recommendations and ac-
cept the responsibility for those recommendations.
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These factors are even more important when the underwriters in-
volved are not personally handling settlement negotiations and
when they are, as in the case of some foreign underwriters, natural-
ly inclined to view settlements, and litigation in the light of their
own countries' system. For example, in some countries defendants
may be reluctant to litigate because litigation is not accomplished
by extensive discovery that would permit a better understanding of
the other side's ability to prove its case. Under such circumstances
there is an effort to learn as much as possible about the claims
prior to the institution of litigation, for, once litigation is begun,
the opportunities for learning about the other side's position are
greatly diminished. Accordingly, the outcome of any such litiga-
tion is particularly unpredictable; it is a gamble that defendants
prefer to avoid.
This understandable attitude, when projected into the United
States context, may result in an appearance of oversensitivity to
litigation. As the more sophisticated foreign underwriters recognize,
litigation in the United States is not the ultimate adversarial act,
much less the ultimate insult. Furthermore, it is the best means
to assure that there is full disclosure by all sides of the facts and
opinions upon which their positions are based. Litigation in the
United States is not necessarily a reflection of a failure of settle-
ment efforts.
In foreign jurisdictions, where significant discovery is not avail-
able after litigation has begun, settlements must be reached on the
basis of the information gathered prior to the commencement of
litigation, as indicated above. What this means is that underwriters
in those jurisdictions may settle their cases on the basis of what
would here be considered insufficient information about the case.
Accordingly, with respect to cases in the United States, foreign
brokers, attorneys, and underwriters have been heard to say that
some underwriters are therefore not accustomed to putting suffi-
cient pressure on their American attorneys in order to obtain,
through litigation or otherwise, full, accurate, and objective in-
formation and analyses upon which the evaluations of a case must
be based.
Of course, when attorneys representing underwriters are by
themselves handling the settlement negotiations and related mat-
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ters, they all too often are able to camouflage unreliable reports
and advice to underwriters by simply recommending a more-than-
sufficient reserve figure. Reserves are particularly important,
for they can involve certain tax benefits, a description of which
is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that under-
reserving costs more money than one might think. In addition,
many claims staffs are faced with an enormous work load and are,
in the normal case, often unable to spend a great deal of time
assessing the information and analyses upon which their attorneys
base their recommendations. Therefore, those recommendations,
at least with respect to reserves, are generally taken at face value,
and the attorneys' performance in settling their cases is measured
against that standard. (The attorneys do not get any credit unless
the reserve figure is set high enough to begin with. Very little in-
furiates underwriters more than an attorney who later raises his
reserve figure and then settles the case within that figure in order
to claim victory.)
For this and other reasons mentioned above, it is not surprising
to find that some underwriters feel overly vulnerable to the attor-
neys on whom they depend. As one might expect, the relationship
between the attorneys and the underwriters, as well as the ten-
sions that can result, may have significant ramifications and may
account for otherwise inexplicable settlement strategies. It must
be added that in many cases the defendants' attorneys do not fully
understand the reasons for the settlement strategy they are pur-
suing. This fact is especially true where underwriters make a settle-
ment offer seemingly at odds with their attorneys' views of the
case. When it happens, it is more than likely the result of the
attorneys seeing only a part of the overall claims picture. Some-
times, however, personalities and attitudes are involved, and the
settlement position is the product of an undisclosed bitterness or
rivalry, or perhaps even an ill-conceived early prediction concern-
ing the outcome of the case. Nevertheless, it is an unfair burden
on defense counsel if they are saddled with attempting settlement,
or even defending the settlement offer before a judge, when such
unseen factors are not revealed.
Whatever their source, outrage and indignation will often cause
a client to ignore the difficulties and risks of litigation and an-
nounce his willingness to do everything it takes to sustain his posi-
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tion. Experienced attorneys will recognize that the client's outrage
and indignation may not last throughout the entire litigation.
The attorneys will have to monitor the evolution of the client's
position and conduct themselves accordingly. In no event should
the attorneys burn their bridges to the other side, for those bridges
may ultimately be useful in reaching a settlement after the furor has
subsided."'
This is not to say that defense counsel should adopt a "buddy-
buddy" approach to plaintiffs' attorneys. Such an approach can
easily be overdone, particularly where the plaintiffs' attorneys are
personal friends, and the result is that the defense counsel goes
along with the plaintiffs' attorneys in order to keep their good will.
In these situations it frequently develops that there is no pressure
at all for the case to proceed. For example, there may be excessive
extensions of time to respond to discovery requests, and in some
situations these may be exchanged for extensions in completely
unrelated litigation. Consequently, all activity ceases-nothing is
learned from discovery, nothing substantive is resolved, and settle-
ment is delayed. Such situations are viewed very unfavorably by
underwriters, who are intently pursuing early settlements through
the Tenerife approach.
A similar problem develops when counsel would rather be nice
to the local judges than take unpopular stands requested by the
underwriters. Even when underwriters are themselves active in
the litigation and are present to take the brunt of the judicial dis-
pleasure, their counsel may still be reluctant to apply pressure and
raise an issue that would cause the judges and the other parties to
generate the necessary damage information, to resolve contro-
versies that obstruct settlements, and to move the litigation along.
These are a few of the ways in which defense counsel may prove
to be unsatisfactory in the efforts toward early settlements. Some
firms may offset these detrimental features with cheap rates or
with special expertise in aviation matters, but, as to the latter,
some underwriters feel that such expertise is frequently overrated
and that they are not getting much more than what a number of
other firms could provide.
71 Cf. Loevinger, The Lawyer's Role Before Litigation, 11 VANe. L. REv. 155,
161-62 (1957).
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XIV. SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS
As to negotiations themselves, very little can be said. Attorneys
do what comes naturally and logically, and it is difficult and per-
haps even pointless to try to conceptualize the way in which they
deal with other attorneys in negotiations. Nevertheless, without
attempting to present a primer of settlement techniques, there are
a few general points to be made here about attitudes and ap-
proaches.
Trial attorneys frequently find the entire settlement process
frustrating and unfulfilling. Yet, they have to recognize that settle-
ment is probably the most important tool available to the trial
lawyer to reach a reasonably satisfactory result for a client. They
also have to keep remembering that, in many instances, effecting
a settlement involves the highest degree of advocacy by trial
lawyers. 1
It should be quickly emphasized that being an advocate does
not necessarily mean being as adversarial as one would normally
be in trials or other litigation proceedings. The obvious idea is
not to antagonize the person with whom negotiations are taking
place, for the negotiations are unlikely to be successful unless there
is cooperation and recognition of each sides' needs." Bickering and
haggling should be avoided. It is also inappropriate to make de-
rogatory remarks or to pick on the opponent, even in jest."'
Condescension is equally disadvantageous, for it, too, can cause
opposition attorneys to bristle and "get their backs up." An attor-
ney must exhibit a positive attitude toward the other side, an
attitude that suggests that he has found them to be fair and hon-
orable opponents, who sincerely believe in their position."
In turn, he is being judged concerning the sincerity and confi-
dence with which he presents his position, for no one wants to
negotiate with an attorney who cannot be believed. The perceived
trustworthiness and credibility of opposing counsel can greatly
influence the course of negotiations, and the attorney who has a
2Elam, Settlement Procedures, 28 INs. COUNSEL J. 602, 603 (1961).
73 Cf. Hurowitz, How to Settle a Support Case, PRAc. LAw., July 15, 1980, 27.
74Gubin, Settling Government Contract Claims, PRAc. LAw., Dec. 1959, 71,
at 72.
"Schneider & Mone, A Positive Approach to Tort Settlements, PRAc. LAw.,
March 1971, 27. [hereinafter cited as Schneider & Mone]
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reputation for presenting claims and defenses fairly, and for openly
and truthfully discussing their nature and effect, has a definite
advantage over attorneys who are unknown or who have a poor
reputation in this regard."
This perception is particularly important in somewhat smaller
cases in which both sides believe that the case should be settled
rather than tried, and that the best way of reaching settlement is
by full disclosure of each side's view of the law and the facts.
An attorney who discloses to the other side his approach and his
supporting evidence feels exposed and uneasy. It will never be
done where there is a distinct distrust of the opposition attor-
ney's ability or willingness to give proper credit to the matters dis-
closed and to be equally candid about the opposition's own ap-
proaches and evidence. Of course, if the decision to shoot for
settlement is a genuine one on both sides, then it is useless to make
the disclosure less than complete, for secret evidence does not en-
courage settlements. This writer has been involved in such an un-
restrained exchange on only one occasion, but that was a signifi-
cant wrongful death case arising out of a hot-air balloon accident.
Lengthy letters were exchanged describing each side's position
and the evidence on which they relied, and the settlement that was
reached seemed to satisfy everyone involved. In addition, it elimi-
nated future fees and expenses, which were expected to be very
high. This approach can probably be used in only a few situations,
but attorneys may not be sufficiently alert to such opportunities
when they do arise.
Aside from its favorable impact on settlement negotiations, the
truthfulness of a defendant or his attorney when dealing with an
unrepresented claimant may head off claims that false information
or improper legal advice was given to the claimant. For example,
one plaintiff sought to bring a class action against an airline for
alleged misstatements concerning its limited liability under baggage
tariffs and the Warsaw Convention. This class action was dis-
missed," but defendants and their attorneys should keep such po-
tential litigation in mind when they are dealing with unrepresented
claimants.
70 See Hurowitz, supra note 73, at 29, 34; Schneider & Mone, supra note 75,
at 28.
" Greeley v. KLM-Royal Dutch Airlines, 85 F.R.D. 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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One way for an attorney to undermine his reputation for credi-
bility and expose his clients to added settlement difficulties in fu-
ture cases is for him to assure his opponent, without qualification,
that the latest offer or demand is the final one. Such assurances
are usually taken as bluffs, and, even if they are given some initial
respect, they turn out to be incorrect so often that similar assur-
ances, and maybe the other things the attorney says, will never
be believed again.
Of course, in a related vein, many lawyers let conceit and
self-delusion destroy their reasonableness and, along with it, their
effectiveness in settlement negotiations. Such attorneys make offers
and demands that are, respectively, ridiculously low or ridiculously
high. To the extent that defendants are faithfully following the
Tenerife approach, this is a problem primarily found in some
plaintiffs' attorneys. Perhaps they hope that exorbitant demands
will attract attention to their claims or to themselves, but for the
most part the design is to put pressure on the defendants to increase
their offers. If the demands are beyond the realm of reason, how-
ever, the predictable result is the defendants' conclusion that the
plaintiffs' attorneys are just not interested in settling their cases.
Less, not more, attention is given to those cases, and any negotia-
tions will probably come to a standstill. The pressure on the de-
fendants is also less; exorbitant demands are easy to reject. Lee
Kreindler has described this situation quite well:
I do not believe that you get responsible, professional, experi-
enced people interested in settling cases, unless you give them an
opportunity to make a good business deal for themselves. The
defendant's lawyer who receives a ridiculous demand figure has
nothing to worry about. Even if the eventual jury comes back with
a large verdict it will probably be less than the plaintiff wanted,
in settlement. The claims adjuster who receives an inflated demand,
similarly, has nothing to worry about. He is not tempted to nego-
tiate, and his offer to the plaintiff is likely to be equally deflated.
The insurance company, or the excess or reinsurance company
that sees a high demand figure has no incentive to talk turkey.
What does it have to lose by trial? There is no point in trying to
settle this case. 8
It is also generally unproductive for plaintiffs' attorneys to write
7s L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW S 43.03 (1978).
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defendants' underwriters pro forma letters suggesting the possi-
bility of bad faith in making settlement offers. Like the boy who
cried "wolf," the plaintiffs' attorneys who use such letters indis-
criminately are unlikely to attract much extra attention to their
cases or to put any extra pressure on underwriters."
All things considered, negotiations have to be thought of as a
cooperative effort, not just a game. An attorney has to understand
the needs of his client and those of the opposition, for settlement
is unlikely unless each side wins something."M It is frequently diffi-
cult to be objective about one's own attempts at cooperation, and
the best example of this involves a plaintiff seen in small claims
court some years ago. She was suing a man for $500, and during
her testimony the judge asked her if she had attempted to settle
her claim. She replied, "Yes, but he won't give me the $500."
Now this and much of everything else discussed above is rather
obvious, but it is equally obvious that many otherwise good attor-
neys fail to live up to their potential in dealing with others, and
their settlement negotiations suffer as a result. Where such an
attorney, rather than exhibiting a proper firmness, is simply ob-
noxious to the opposition, another attorney in the firm should
handle the settlement negotiations. The resulting situation is a
little bit like the "good cop-bad cop" routine for obtaining con-
fessions. Sometimes this happens at the insistence of the opposi-
tion, who would rather not get into a hassle with the obnoxious
:attorney, that might result in a complete halt to the settlement
-negotiations. They may prefer to make an extra effort to settle the
-matter with the other attorney.
XV. ASSESSING THE VALUE OF THE CASE
Ultimately, the most important influence on settlement negotia-
tions is each party's assessment (which, as has already been
stressed, should be a hard-headed and detached assessment) of a
number of factors that have been outlined in many articles: 1
79 The threat of well-founded bad faith claims might, indeed, be an important
factor in settlement negotiations, but this is a subject that has received substantial
,attention elsewhere, so I have confined this presentation to more typical situations.
SO Hurowitz, supra note 73, at 29.
"See, e.g., Elam, Settlement Procedures, 28 INS. COUNSEL J. 602, 603-06
,(1961); Galiher, The Defendant's Lawyer Looks at Settlement, 31 INS. COUNSEL
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-The extent of insurance coverage.
-The clearness of the facts supporting liability and injury
claims.
-The nature of the accident and fault; the dramatic or
emotional aspects of the events and circumstances to be de-
scribed to the jury.
-The nature and effect of the injuries; their visibility, their
permanence, their connection to pre-existing conditions, etc.
-The extent of special damages.
-The place of the trial; the attitudes of the panel from
whom the jury will be chosen.
-The impressions that the plaintiff and defendant will
make on the jury.
-The impressions that the parties' witnesses will make on
the jury.
-The probable disposition of legal issues, particularly evi-
dentiary issues, by the court.
-The readiness and ability of the parties' attorneys to try
the case; their talent; and the impressions they will make on
the jury.
The last factor relates especially closely to the rest of this
paper. Specifically, if an attorney's presence in the case is to have
a maximum positive effect during settlement negotiations, he not
only needs to be able to explain his position convincingly, but he
also must have a reputation for competence in trials, based upon
his willingness and ability to obtain full discovery, to deal care-
fully with the discovery against his client, to master the facts and
the applicable law, to determine which evidence is important to use
at trial and which evidence is not, and so forth. In other words,
the other side must expect the attorney to prepare the case for
trial thoroughly and competently. Moreover, the earlier he is
prepared to go to trial, the better off he will be in settlement
negotiations. An attorney cannot evaluate the facts without know-
ing the applicable law, and, until he evaluates the full facts, he
will not know the odds of prevailing and, thereby, the case's real
worth. "In many, many cases failure to reach a common area of
agreement is in direct proportion to an attorney's failure in prepa-
J. 65 (1964); Kelner, Settlement of Personal Injury Cases, 53 N.Y. ST. B. J. 116
(1981).
1981] SETTLEMENT IN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT CASES 939
ration for the pretrial or trial, and the resulting failure of compre-
hension, understanding and evaluation of the case at issue."8 An
attorney and his client cannot depend upon selling his analysis to
the other side until he has analyzed the case thoroughly. In sum-
mary, preparation is "all important."'
An attorney's preparation for trial can significantly affect settle-
ment negotiations only if the other side considers him able to
make the most of that preparation at trial. For example, does he
have the talent to get witnesses to say what he wants them to say
when he wants them to say it? Perhaps more important, at least
in close cases, is a defense attorney's ability to offset the natural
sympathy for the other side by getting the jury to like him or by
getting the jury's empathy, if not sympathy, for himself. If he has
that ability, it is certainly something the other side should consider
in determining the settlement value of the case.
Where the other attorney is unknown and his abilities cannot
be personally assessed, reliance will have to be placed on his
general reputation, and one may agree with the wag who said that
the best way for a defense attorney to get a respected reputation
is to lose big. If a defense attorney wins a favorable verdict, it is
usually assumed that the verdict reflects the weakness of the plain-
tiff's case; there is just no way to measure the attorney's accom-
plishment objectively. On the other hand, if he is "hit" with a large
verdict, everyone will respectfully observe that the attorney must
really be good if he is trying big cases of such proven worth.
Bringing this paper to a close is difficult because of the many
matters that have been left untouched or that have been discussed
only superficially; much remains to be said. The hope is that this
paper's brief description of certain factors influencing settlement
will deepen the dialogue among judges, lawyers, and clients about
maximizing settlement possibilities. As indicated, particular atten-
tion should be given to curtailing excessive fees, unnecessary de-
lays, and unreliable advice to clients.
In concluding, it must be admitted that a good bit of what has
82 Fox, Settlement: Helping the Lawyers to Fulfill their Responsibility, 53
F.R.D. 129, 1:36 (1972).
83 Elam, supra note 62, at 603. Accord, Schneider & Mone, A Positive Ap-
proach to Tort Settlement, PRAc. LAW., March 1971, 27, at 29, where it is proper-
ly stated: "Preparation is the most important part of trial practice, regardless of
whether the case is settled or tried."
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been said in this paper is about as obvious as what the high-
powered computer told the stockbroker who had fed it with every
known bit of information on the stock market. Everyone will re-
call that the computer's advice was simply, "Buy low; sell high."
Similarly, in response to the lawyer's ultimate question of when
to settle and when to litigate, this writer's profound response is:
Settle the case whenever it is to your client's advantage.
